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I.   INTRODUCTION
The right to decide without government interference whether and
when to have children does not seem at all controversial when preg-
nancy prevention is the issue.1 However, when there is a “potential
life” at stake, the relationship between the right to decide and the
right of the government to intrude becomes far more emotional and
complex. “Potential life” or “personhood” is somewhat arbitrarily de-
fined. Depending on one’s religious or philosophic views, life may
begin anywhere from conception to implantation to “quickening” to
viability to survivability to birth.2 In a recent poll of Florida voters,
the pollsters came to this conclusion:
                                                                                                                   
* Sole Practitioner, Tallahassee, Fla. B.A., Florida Atlantic University, 1973; J.D.,
Florida State University School of Law, 1977; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center,
1982. The author is a Florida lawyer practicing in the area of state constitutional rights.
In 1989 she was one of two lead attorneys prevailing in In re T.W., 543 So. 2d 837 (Fla.
1989). She was also Legislative Counsel for the ACLU of Florida from 1987 through 1994.
1. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that a state
statute proscribing the use of contraceptives violated married couples’ right to privacy
implied in the Bill of Rights); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (holding that a
state statute proscribing the use of contraceptives violated unmarried individuals’ privacy
rights).
2. See generally Keeler v. Superior Ct., 470 P.2d 617, 628 (Cal. 1970) (holding that
the defendant could not be charged for the murder of an unborn fetus pursuant to the
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Pro-life voters see all life as a priori and the need to protect it self-
evident. Pro-choice voters, on the other hand, see it not in black
and white terms, but in many shades of gray. For these voters, not
all life is necessarily meaningful and sacred. In the end, the debate
over abortion is not about the rights of a woman versus the rights
of the unborn, but the definition of life itself.3
The Florida Supreme Court has consistently ruled in tort cases
that there is no “person” with any rights, standing, or entitlement to
any damages until there is a live birth.4 Although inapplicable to
laws criminalizing involuntary abortion or abortion after viability,5
this principle has been upheld as applied to criminal laws6 with only
one exception.7
                                                                                                                   
state statute because the Legislature did not intend to include unborn fetuses in the defi-
nition of “human being,” but intended “human being” to have the common law meaning of
a person born alive); Jones v. Commonwealth, 830 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Ky. 1992) (holding
that the defendant can be charged for the murder of a baby if the injuries causing death
were inflicted to the fetus prior to the birth and the baby was born alive); Davis v. Davis,
842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn. 1992) (finding that frozen embryos, in a custody dispute, are
not human beings but should be afforded more respect than human tissue because of the
embryos’ potential to become human beings).
3. The Abortion Attitude Paradox, FLORIDA VOTER (Austin Forman Center for Politi-
cal Studies, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), June-July 1997, at 1, 2.
4. See, e.g., Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 1997) (finding expectant
parents cannot prevail on a wrongful death claim because a fetus is not a person, but
holding expectant parents can prevail on a claim for the emotional suffering inflicted by
the birth of the stillborn fetus due to the doctor’s negligence).
5. See State v. Ashley, 670 So. 2d 1087, 1089 (Fla. 2d DCA), reh’g granted, 678 So.
2d 339 (Fla. 1996), quashed in part, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S682 (Fla. Oct. 30, 1997). Ashley in-
volved a woman who could not afford to pay for an abortion. At the beginning of her third
trimester of pregnancy and after weeks of unsuccessfully attempting to raise the neces-
sary money, she shot herself in the abdomen “to hurt the baby.” A Caesarean section was
performed. There was a live birth. The bullet had passed through the wrist of the fetus.
The infant lived for 15 days and died as a result of multi-organ problems caused by pre-
mature birth and not by the bullet wound. See id. at 1088.
The state charged Ashley with manslaughter, under section 782.07, Florida Statutes,
and with felony murder under section 782.04(4), Florida Statutes. The latter charge was
based on committing the felony of performing an illegal abortion on herself, contrary to
section 390.001(10)(a), Florida Statutes. Section 390.001(10)(a) makes it a third degree
felony for anyone other than a physician to perform an abortion. In an interlocutory ap-
peal, the court threw out the illegal abortion charge and upheld the simple manslaughter
charge because the infant was born alive and then died indirectly due to Ashley’s actions.
See id. at 1093.
The Florida Supreme Court held the state cannot prosecute Ashley for either murder or
manslaughter because the statute failed to explicitly trump the long-standing common
law that holds a woman who self-inflicts injuries while pregnant cannot be criminally li-
able for the death of her fetus if it dies after birth. See State v. Ashley, 22 Fla. L. Weekly
S682, S683 (Fla. Oct. 30, 1997). Moreover, the court concluded that the Legislature had
not evidenced an intent to “pit woman against fetus in criminal court.” Id. at S683.
6. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1992).
7. The willful killing of an unborn “quick” child by an injury to the mother is man-
slaughter if the injury was inflicted in such a way as would have made it murder if the
injury caused the mother’s death. See FLA. STAT. § 782.09 (1997); see also Williams v.
State, 15 So. 760, 760 (1894) (affirming the defendant’s manslaughter conviction for beat-
ing his pregnant wife with a club, causing the premature birth of her baby, who subse-
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Although the Florida Legislature entered the debate, its focus has
not been on the definition of life itself. Rather, the Legislature has
sought to impose procedural requirements on doctors performing
abortions,8 to restrict insurance coverage for abortions,9 and to ban
certain types of abortions.10 However, prior to 1997, none of the Leg-
islature’s attempts to modify a woman’s right to an abortion had
been successful. Up until the 1997 Regular Session, the Florida
Legislature had not passed a bill placing restrictions on abortion for
nearly a decade.11 In 1997, the Woman’s Right-To-Know Act became
law.12 The Act requires that women seeking to terminate a preg-
nancy in Florida be provided with oral and printed information
about specific aspects of pregnancy, abortion, and childbirth prior to
the abortion procedure.13 Physicians who violate the Act are subject
to professional discipline, including license revocation.14 The Act has
been temporarily enjoined, and the injunction is being appealed by
the state.15
Part II of this Article discusses the protections afforded women
seeking an abortion under the U.S. Constitution, while Part III ex-
amines protections under the Florida Constitution. Part IV provides
a constitutional analysis of the three bills restricting abortion that
were considered by the 1997 Florida Legislature, most significantly
The Woman’s-Right-To-Know Act. Finally, Part V concludes that the
restrictions in place prior to the passage of The Woman’s-Right-To-
Know Act maintained an appropriate balance between the pregnant
woman’s life and health and the life and health of the fetus.
                                                                                                                   
quently died due to the battery). Although criminal charges have been filed under circum-
stances where a fetus has died as a result of a criminal act toward the pregnant woman,
appellate review of the statute’s constitutionality has been prevented because the state
has charged the perpetrator under a different, inapplicable statutory section, the injury
was followed by a live birth prior to the infant’s death, or some other condition was not
met that prevented challenging the validity of the statute on appeal. See, e.g., Knighton v.
State, 603 So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (affirming a third-degree murder charge be-
cause the defendant shot a bullet into the head of a viable fetus who, although born alive,
died as a direct result of the gunshot wound).
8. See, e.g., Fla. HB 1205 (1997) (Woman’s Right-To-Know Act).
9. See Fla. SB 2304 (1997) (Employee Health Care Access Act).
10. See Fla. CS for HB 1227 (1997) (Abortion Method Ban Bill).
11. In 1988, the Parental Consent Abortion Law was enacted. See Act effective Oct. 1,
1988, ch. 88-97, § 6, 1988 Fla. Laws 460, 462-63 (amending FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a)
(1987)) (requiring physicians performing abortions on minors to obtain the written con-
sent of the minor’s parent, custodian, or legal guardian or permitting the physician to rely
on a judicial order).
12. See Act effective July 1, 1997, ch. 97-151, 1997 Fla. Laws 2501 (amending FLA.
STAT. ch. 390 (1995 & Supp. 1996)).
13. See FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(3) (1997).
14. See id. § 390.0111(3)(c).
15. See Presidential Women’s Ctr. v. State, No. 97-5796 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. July 2,
1997) (order granting preliminary injunction), appeal docketed, No. 97-2557 (4th DCA filed
July 24, 1997).
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II.   A BRIEF SUMMARY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS AS APPLIED TO ABORTION
UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
In Roe v. Wade,16 the United States Supreme Court struggled with
the issue of determining at what point a state can constitutionally
prevent a pregnant woman from terminating a “potential life.”17 The
Roe Court defined fundamental reproductive privacy rights and the
scope of the state’s authority to regulate those rights.18 The Court
decided the word “person” did not include the unborn19 and estab-
lished a trimester framework as a paradigm to balance the pregnant
woman’s privacy interests with the state’s interests in the health of
the mother and the potential life of the fetus.20
Pursuant to Roe, the state’s important and legitimate interest in
the health of the mother becomes compelling at approximately the
end of the first trimester.21 During this stage, the doctor and patient
are permitted to decide, without state interference, whether or not to
terminate a pregnancy.22 They may act on that decision free of gov-
ernment restrictions.23 After this stage, the state can regulate abor-
                                                                                                                   
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. See id. Prior to Roe, the Court upheld a provision of the District of Columbia Code
criminalizing abortion because it “[did] not outlaw all abortions, but only those that are
not performed under the direction of a competent, licensed physician, and those not neces-
sary to preserve the mother’s life or health.” United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70
(1971). The decision expressly defined “health” as including all aspects of a woman’s
physical and mental health. See id. at 72.
18. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is,
or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose
upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Spe-
cific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be
involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a dis-
tressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to
care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continu-
ing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the
woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.
Id. at 153.
19. See id. at 158.
20. See id. at 164. But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992)
(retreating from the strict trimester framework as an overly rigid paradigm for protecting
a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion).
21. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate
interest in the health of the mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical
knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester.”). Based on medical knowl-
edge, the Court explained that mortality rates in abortion can be less than mortality rates
in normal childbirth. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
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tion as long as the restrictions are reasonably related to the
“preservation and protection of maternal health.”24
At some point, generally at the beginning of the third trimester,
viability of the fetus becomes an issue. This is because the fetus can
presumably have a “meaningful life outside of the mother’s womb.”25
Thus, after viability, the state can implement restrictions on abor-
tion that extend as far as prohibition of the procedure.26 However,
the state may not impose restrictions on therapeutic abortions when
the mother’s life or health is at stake, even after viability.27
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey ,28 the U.S. Supreme Court re-
treated from the strict trimester framework.29 The plurality held that
restrictions that do not impose an “undue burden” on abortion are
permissible and that states can express a preference for childbirth
over abortion in their laws.30 In response, state legislatures have at-
tempted to impose, sometimes successfully, numerous restrictions on
abortions to make them more difficult to obtain than other medical
procedures.31 Courts strike down these laws when they clearly re-
strict abortions throughout the pregnancy that are necessary to pre-
serve the life or health of the pregnant woman.32 Courts have also
struck down laws that restrict abortions prior to viability, when the
restriction does not promote maternal health or conflicts with
women’s privacy rights to make their own decisions about whether
and when to have children.33 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has
                                                                                                                   
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 163-64.
27. See id.
28. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
29. See id. at 876 (holding that the state can regulate abortion as long as it does not
place a substantial burden on a woman’s ability to have an abortion prior to viability).
30. See id. at 878.
31. See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d. 1452, 1460, 1463 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding unconstitutional parental notification provisions, a criminal penalty provision,
and a civil penalty provision of a South Dakota abortion statute), cert. denied sub nom,
Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 116 S. Ct. 1582 (1996); Fargo Women’s Med. Org. v.
Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 533-35 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding the constitutionality of informed
consent provisions, a 24-hour waiting period, and the definition of “medical emergency” in
a North Dakota abortion statute).
32. See Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1060 (S.D. Ohio
1995), aff’d, Nos. 96-3157, 96-3159, 1997 WL 713520, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1997)
(holding unconstitutional an Ohio statute that only permitted post-viability abortions to
be performed to prevent the pregnant woman’s death or injury to a major bodily function,
but not for abortions performed to preserve the pregnant woman’s general health); Evans
v. Kelly, 1997 WL 471906 at *37 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 1997) (enjoining a Michigan statute
that banned partial birth abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Woods, No. 97-385, (D. Ariz.
Oct. 24, 1997) (enjoining an Arizona statute criminalizing partial birth abortion).
33. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 893-94 (striking down a Pennsylvania spousal consent re-
quirement in abortion procedures); Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1113
(5th Cir. 1997) (holding unconstitutional a Louisiana parental consent law because it did
not impose specific time limits for judicial bypass proceedings and failed to require that
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approved carefully crafted state laws that require a brief waiting
period prior to obtaining an abortion, detailed informed consent pro-
cedures, and parental consent for minors’ abortions.34 The Supreme
Court has also approved a federal prohibition on the use of Medicaid
funds to reimburse indigents for the costs of abortions35 and a statu-
tory ban on the use of public employees and facilities for abortions
not performed to save the life of the pregnant woman.36 However, the
Court has not retreated from the holding in Roe that states cannot
restrict abortion after viability when continuing a pregnancy would
endanger the mother’s health or life,37 or prior to viability when the
restriction is not reasonably related to maternal health.38
III.   A BRIEF SUMMARY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS AS APPLIED TO ABORTION
UNDER THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
“[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.”39 The Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution provides, “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.”40 Thus, under the Tenth Amendment, state constitutions
may contain a wide variety of provisions that will be deemed valid as
long as they do not exceed the few restrictions the U.S. Constitution
imposes on the exercise of governmental powers.41 The Ninth
Amendment makes it clear that citizens’ rights are not limited to the
ones defined and specifically included in the U.S. Constitution.42
                                                                                                                   
judges must authorize abortions for minors who were found to be mature or when an
abortion would be in the minors’ best interest).
34. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887, 899.
35. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324 (1980).
36. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989).
37. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872, 880 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
38. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 77-79 (1976) (striking down a
Missouri statute that banned saline induction abortions after the first 12 weeks of preg-
nancy), partially overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(overruling the holding that provisions of an abortion law requiring informed consent and
a 24-hour waiting period were unconstitutional).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
40. Id. amend. IX.
41. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (holding that a
state may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property in a state constitution if the
restrictions do not violate the U.S. Constitution); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 800 (1995) (holding that states cannot impose additional qualifications required
for candidates to serve in the U.S. Congress than are already established in the U.S. Con-
stitution); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (holding that Congress can
exclude from interstate commerce goods that have been manufactured in a way that dam-
ages citizens’ welfare).
42. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 998.
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The U.S. Supreme Court clarified that, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, states are not permitted to infringe or violate the indi-
vidual rights of citizens established under the U.S. Constitution.43 In
combination with the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, this require-
ment provides the foundation for the principle that states may not
provide lesser or fewer protections of the individual rights already
identified in the federal Constitution, but state constitutions are
clearly authorized to provide additional rights or greater protections
of federal rights.44
In In re T.W.,45 the Florida Supreme Court explained this princi-
ple:
The Court, however, has made it clear that the states, not the fed-
eral government, are the final guarantors of personal privacy: “But
the protection of a person’s general right to privacy—his right to be
let alone by other people—is, like the protection of his property
and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual
States.”46
Thus, article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, the “privacy
amendment,” extends more protection to individual privacy interests
than does the federal Constitution.47
The difference in force and function between state and federal
protection of rights addresses the impropriety of relying on U.S. Su-
preme Court cases, such as Casey, as the ultimate and binding
authority to follow when determining whether state abortion re-
strictions meet state constitutional requirements. The U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the extent to which a state is prohibited
from interfering with, infringing upon, or violating similar federal
                                                                                                                   
43. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
44. See Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81; Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 1992)
(explaining that courts must first evaluate whether the admission of the defendant’s con-
fession as evidence violated the state constitution before evaluating whether it violated
the federal Constitution); William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977); Rachel E. Fugate, Comment, The
Florida Constitution: Still Champion of Citizens’ Rights? , 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 87 (1997).
45. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
46. See id. at 1191 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)) (footnotes
omitted).
47. See id.
Since the people of this state exercised their prerogative and enacted an
amendment to the Florida Constitution which expressly and succinctly pro-
vides for a strong right of privacy not found in the United States Constitution,
it can only be concluded that the right is much broader in scope than that of
the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 1191-92 (quoting Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla.
1985)).
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constitutional rights is merely a base line beneath which no state
may fall.48
Therefore, as long as the state’s protections do not fall below those
afforded by the U.S. Constitution, the standard applied when testing
whether an individual’s state constitutional rights have been vio-
lated is the standard established by that state’s supreme court.49 The
Florida Supreme Court has long rejected restricting the protection of
individuals’ state constitutional rights only to the same degree of
protection provided by their federal counterparts.50 For example,
twenty-five years ago, just before Roe was decided, in a case success-
fully challenging Florida’s statute making it a felony for doctors to
perform abortions except where necessary to protect the pregnant
woman’s life, the Florida Supreme Court noted that:
“State courts are not bound to follow a decision of a federal
court, even the United States Supreme Court, dealing with state
law. Thus a state court is not bound to follow a decision of a federal
court, even the United States Supreme Court, construing the con-
stitution or a statute of that state.”51
Despite the clear message that Florida’s constitutional protection of
privacy rights related to abortion is even stronger than the protec-
tion provided by the federal Constitution, the Florida Legislature at-
tempted to restrict these rights by enacting a new law in 1988 re-
quiring parental consent or a court order for minors’ abortions.52
A.   In re T.W. and the Parental Consent Law
Florida’s Parental Consent Law went into effect on October 1,
1988.53 It was temporarily enjoined by the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida on October 6, 1988, because
it failed to provide procedural protections for minors seeking to use
the law’s judicial consent bypass.54 The Florida Supreme Court
promulgated rules pursuant to the Parental Consent Law in order to
ensure that the judicial bypass proceedings were conducted confi-
                                                                                                                   
48. See Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 962 (“In any given state, the federal Constitution thus
represents the floor for basic freedoms; the state constitution, the ceiling.”) (citation omit-
ted).
49. See id.
50. See State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 435 (Fla. 1972). But see State v. Owen, 696
So. 2d 715, 720 (Fla. 1997) (holding that the Florida Constitution does not impose greater
restrictions on law enforcement than those required by the U.S. Constitution).
51. Barquet, 262 So. 2d at 435 (quoting 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 225 (1964)).
52. See FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (Supp. 1988), repealed by Act effective May 30,
1991, ch. 91-223, § 6, 1991 Fla. Laws 2166.
53. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1988, ch. 88-97, § 6, 1988 Fla. Laws 460, 462-63
(amending FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (1987)).
54. See Jacksonville Clergy Consultation Serv., Inc. v. Martinez, 696 F. Supp. 1445,
1448 (M.D. Fla. 1988), order dissolved, 707 F. Supp. 1301, 1304 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
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dentially and expeditiously.55 Thereafter, the district court granted
the state’s motion to dissolve the injunction on February 13, 1989.56
The Plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, but by then the law
was in effect.
In 1989, a minor in central Florida petitioned the circuit court for
an order allowing her to have an abortion without her parent’s con-
sent.57 Within forty-eight hours, the court found the law unconstitu-
tionally vague and the young woman too immature to consent.58 De-
spite holding the consent requirement unconstitutional, the judge re-
fused to grant an order allowing her to proceed with the abortion
without obtaining parental consent.59 On May 12, 1989, the Fifth
District Court of Appeal vacated the circuit court’s order, allowing
the minor to proceed with the abortion.60 The Florida Supreme Court
granted a stay of the Fifth District’s mandate again postponing the
abortion, but vacated the stay four days later. The court set In re
T.W. for oral argument in September 1989 to determine the consti-
tutionality of the parental consent law.61 Only a few hours after the
Florida Supreme Court dissolved the stay, U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy issued an order, once again blocking the
young woman’s ability to have an abortion.62 The U.S. Supreme
Court set aside Justice Kennedy’s order the following day.63 This
paved the way for the young woman to finally have the abortion.64
At the same time, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 65 was
pending in the U.S. Supreme Court. One of the issues addressed in
Webster was whether or not a state could constitutionally declare
that life begins at conception.66 New appointments to the U.S. Su-
preme Court led people to believe the courts would be more conser-
                                                                                                                   
55. See In re Emergency Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, 536 So. 2d 198, 198 (Fla. 1988); FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a)(3) (Supp. 1988)
(“The Supreme Court may promulgate any rules it considers necessary to ensure that pro-
ceedings brought pursuant to this paragraph are handled expeditiously and are kept con-
fidential.”).
56. See Jacksonville Clergy, 707 F. Supp. at 1304.
57. See In re T.W., 543 So. 2d 837, 838 (Fla. 5th DCA), aff’d, 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla.
1989).
58. See id. at 841.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 842.
61. See Stephen Koff, Justice Kennedy Says No to Florida Teen’s Abortion, ST. PETE.
TIMES, May 17, 1989, at A1.
62. See id.
63. See Ruth Marcus, Court Clears Way for Teen-Ager’s Abortion, WASH. POST, May
19, 1989, at A7.
64. See id.
65. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
66. See id. at 506.
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vative on this issue.67 Abortion opponents touted Webster as the case
that would overturn Roe.68
Florida’s anti-abortion Governor, Robert Martinez, was more than
ready to take advantage of this possible good fortune. Following the
close of the 1989 Regular Session and prior to the Webster decision,
Governor Martinez called a special legislative session for mid-
October to consider implementing additional restrictions on abor-
tion.69 While the decision in In re T.W. was pending and after Gover-
nor Martinez called for the special session, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Webster.
B.   The Effect of Webster on In re T.W.
The Webster decision disappointed both supporters and opponents
of abortion rights.70 Although the Court in Webster allowed Missouri
to make the statement that life begins at conception, the Court pro-
hibited the state from making abortion illegal.71 The plurality deci-
sion retreated from the trimester framework established in Roe by
upholding a Missouri statute requiring physicians to determine
whether a fetus is viable prior to performing an abortion if the phy-
sician suspects the woman to be twenty weeks pregnant or more.72
However, the plurality in Webster failed to clearly articulate what
standard would replace the trimester framework.73
All of the briefs had been filed and the oral argument had been
held in In re T.W. before the Webster decision was issued. As a result,
the Florida Supreme Court ordered all parties to submit supplemen-
tal briefs on the effect of Webster on In re T.W. and Florida abortion
                                                                                                                   
67. Justice Antonin Scalia, a conservative, was appointed to the court by President
Ronald Reagan in 1986 to replace the seat left vacant by the resignation of Warren E.
Burger. See Ruth Marcus, Rehnquist, Scalia Take Their Oaths; Reagan Lauds Burger at
Retirement, WASH. POST, June 19, 1986, at A14. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, a moderate
conservative, was appointed by Ronald Reagan to replace the seat vacated by Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. See Al Kamen, Kennedy Confirmed, 97-0; Senate Approves Supreme Court
Nomination, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1988, at A1.
68. See Andrea Sachs, Abortion on the Ropes: Is the Historic Roe v. Wade Ruling
About to Be Overturned?, TIME, Dec. 1988, at 58.
69. See Proclamation of Governor Martinez (July 25, 1989) (available at Fla. Dep’t of
State, Div. of Archives, ser. 13, carton 40, Tallahassee, Fla.); see also Tim Nickens, Capitol
Set for Abortion Throng , ST. PETE. TIMES, July 28, 1989, at B6.
70. See Robert Post, Webster’s Chaotic Aftermath, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1989, § 2, at 7
(detailing the negative impact the decision could have on the pro-choice movement); Ford
Fessenden et al., The Abortion Decision Foes Elated by Ruling, NEWSDAY, July 4, 1989, at
5.; Ethan Bronner, Ruling in Missouri Case, Narrows Roe v. Wade, BOSTON GLOBE, July 4,
1989, at 1.
71. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 506 (1989).
72. See id. at 519.
73. In Webster, two restrictions were approved. One allowed public medical facilities
to refuse to perform abortions unless necessary to save a woman’s life. See id. at 507. The
other required extensive medical tests to determine whether a fetus was viable prior to
performing an abortion after 20 weeks gestation. See id. at 519-20.
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laws. On October 5, 1989, less than two weeks before the special
legislative session was to begin, the Florida Supreme Court issued
its decision. In sum, the majority decided that the privacy rights
provision of the Florida Constitution74 protected decisions relating to
reproduction more broadly than the federal Constitution.75 There-
fore, the court invalidated the parental consent law.76
After many committee meetings, much marching, and media cov-
erage, the special session of the Florida Legislature convened that
October. There were numerous bills pending that would have re-
stricted abortion in various and sundry ways.77 After two days of de-
bate, each bill was voted down in committee.78 The senators and rep-
resentatives left Tallahassee without passing a single one.79
Abortion law in Florida remained unchanged and continues to
follow Roe.80 Abortion during the third trimester is illegal unless an
abortion is necessary to save the life or preserve the health of the
pregnant woman.81 Prior to the third trimester, only laws necessary
to protect the health of pregnant women and that do not interfere
with a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion will be consid-
ered valid.82
Since 1989, the Legislature has sought to restrict abortion rights
in various ways, but until the passage of the Woman’s Right-To-
Know Act in 1997, each attempt failed to become law.83 In addition to
the Woman’s Right-To-Know Act, the 1997 Legislature sought to im-
pose several other restrictions on abortion. Although these efforts
were unsuccessful in 1997, House Bill 1701 will be carried over to
the 1998 legislative session, pursuant to House Rule 96.84 Others will
be offered again by legislators.
                                                                                                                   
74. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every natural person has the right to be let alone
and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided
herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public re-
cords and meetings as provided by law.”).
75. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1989).
76. See id. at 1194-95.
77. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1989 SPECIAL SESSION C,
HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 839, SB 3-C, SB 4-C, SB 9-C, SB 10-C, SB 11-C, SB 13-C; id.,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 840-42, HB 4-C, HB 5-C, HB 9-C, HB 10-C, HB 17-C, HB 18-
C, HB 19-C, HB 20-C, HB 21-C, HB 27-C, HB 28-C, HB 29-C, HB 30-C, HB 32-C, HB 34-C.
78. See id.
79. See Diane Rado et al., Lawmakers Reject Abortion Limits, ST. PETE. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1989, at A1.
80. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191-93 (explaining that the Florida Constitution
protects the right to privacy more broadly than the federal Constitution).
81. See FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(4) (1997).
82. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1189.
83. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
84. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 310, HB 1701.
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IV.   ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT ABORTION BY THE 1997 FLORIDA
LEGISLATURE
A.   The Abortion Method Ban Bill
The “Abortion Method Ban Bill,”85 also known as the Partial-Birth
Abortion Bill, prohibited abortions where the physician “partially
vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and complet-
ing the delivery.”86 The Governor vetoed the Abortion Method Ban
Bill on May 23, 1997.87 If the legislation had become law, a person
performing such an abortion would have committed a third-degree
felony and would have been subject to civil liability.88 The only ex-
ception would have been when a “partial-birth abortion” was
“necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a
physical disorder, illness, or injury, provided that no other medical
procedure would suffice for that purpose.”89
The medical terms for these forms of abortion are dilation and
evacuation (D&E) or dilation and intact extraction (D&X). Second
and third trimester abortions comprise only a very small percentage
of all abortions performed.90 D&E and D&X are often used in second
or third trimester abortions because they are the safest methods
available for particular patients, and they are the methods most
likely to assure women’s future fertility.91 The D&X procedure is less
invasive than other abortion procedures and, therefore, poses a lower
risk to maternal health.92 The American College of Obstetricians and
                                                                                                                   
85. Fla. CS for HB 1227 (1997) (substituted for Fla. CS for SB 1398 (1997)).
86. Fla. CS for HB 1227, § 1(5) (1997) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 390.011
(1995)).
87. See Veto of Fla. CS for HB 1227 (1997) (letter from Gov. Chiles to Sec’y of State
Sandra Mortham, May 23, 1997) (on file with Sec’y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee,
Fla.).
88. See Fla. CS for HB 1227, § 2(11)(a), (12) (1997) (proposed amendment to FLA.
STAT. § 390.001 (1995)).
89. Id. § 2(6)(c). This is not the first attempt by a state to restrict abortion by banning
a particular procedure. In 1976, before dilation and evacuation or dilation and intact ex-
traction methods were available, the U.S. Supreme Court found a Missouri statute prohib-
iting saline induction abortions unconstitutional. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 76-79 (1976), partially overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992). No cases have placed this precedent in question.
90. See Michelle Roman, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act and the Undue Burden
It Places on Women’s Right to an Abortion: The Controversy over D&E, Dilation and Ex-
traction, 18 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 381, 381 (1997).
91. See Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1070-71 (S.D.
Ohio 1995), aff’d, Nos. 96-3157, 96-3159, 1997 WL 713520, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1997).
92. See id. at 1070-71. The court found D&X was safer than fluid induction, D&E,
hysterotomy, and hysterectomy. See id. at 1070. In comparing the D&X procedure to
D&E, which was not banned, the court explained, “it does not require sharp instruments
to be inserted into the uterus with the same frequency or extent [] and does not pose the
same degree of risk of uterine and cervical lacerations, due to the reduced use of forceps in
the uterus.” Id.
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Gynecologists advises against the use of hysterotomy93 and hysterec-
tomy94 “because of their prohibitively high mortality and morbid-
ity.”95 Fluid induction abortions, such as saline, also have several
contraindications, such as when a woman has hypertension or
asthma.96 Nevertheless, anti-abortion groups have painted D&X
abortions as especially cruel and gruesome.97
1.   Void-For-Vagueness
The Abortion Method Ban Bill would have prohibited most, if not
all, D&X and D&E procedures whether performed before or after vi-
ability.98 The Legislature did not define “living fetus” as opposed to
“viable fetus.”99 This is clearly an effort to propagate the misconcep-
tion that, short of a stillbirth, all fetuses are capable of life outside
the womb. The fact that the language chosen by the bill’s drafters is
intentionally emotionally charged, rather than technically correct, it
is also unconstitutionally vague.
The term “partial birth abortion” is ambiguous. In Planned Par-
enthood v. Woods ,100 the court enjoined a Partial Birth Abortion Act
because the court found the definition of “partial birth abortion,”
which was similar to Florida’s definition, to be susceptible to various
interpretations.101 The court held that the Act failed to sufficiently
define the conduct it proscribed.102
Furthermore, the phrase “necessary to save the life of the mother”
is also ambiguous.103 In State v. Barquet ,104 the Florida Supreme
                                                                                                                   
93. Hysterotomy is basically a Caesarean section performed before term. An alterna-
tive to D&X, it is “potentially more dangerous because the uterus is thicker than it is at
the end of term, and the incision causes more bleeding and may make future pregnancies
more difficult. . . . Both of these methods entail the risks associated with major surgical
procedures, and are rarely used today.” Id. at 1068.
94. Hysterectomy is more extreme than D&X because it requires the removal of the
uterus through major surgery and results in total inability to bear children. See id.
95. Methods of Midtrimester Abortion, ACOG TECHNICAL BULL. (American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Wash., DC), Oct. 1987, at 2.
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Melissa Healy, Senate Upholds Veto of Late-Term Abortion Ban, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996, at A13.
98. See Fla. CS for HB 1227, § 2(6) (1997) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. §
390.001 (1995)).
99. “‘Partial-birth abortion’ means a termination of pregnancy in which the physician
performing the termination of pregnancy partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before
killing the fetus and completing the delivery.” Id. § 1(5) (emphasis added).
100. No. 97-385 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 1997).
101. See id. at 22 (quoting the definition of “partial birth abortion” as “partially vagi-
nally delivering a fetus before killing the fetus”). The defendants admitted the term
“partial birth abortion” is not used in any medical text or treatise. See id.
102. See id.
103. See Fla. CS for HB 1227, § 2(6)(c) (1997) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. §
390.001 (1995)).
104. 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972).
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Court held that a state statute restricting abortions to instances that
are “necessary to preserve the life of [the] mother” is unconstitu-
tionally vague and violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.105 The Court explained that the treating physician was
at risk of being charged with a felony if he erroneously interpreted
the language of the statute.106 The court warned, “[t]his is precisely
the kind of situation that the void-for-vagueness doctrine is intended
to prevent.”107
2.   Failure to Protect Maternal Health
The most obvious constitutional violation is the failure of these
bills to permit this form of abortion under circumstances where nec-
essary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman for reasons other
than the ones listed in the bill, or where necessary to preserve her
health.108
The Florida Supreme Court has explained the importance of pro-
tecting women’s health when crafting abortion laws. To be valid,
abortion restrictions must protect the women’s right to privacy in the
first trimester, maternal health in the second and third trimester,
and balance between the potential life of the fetus and the health of
the pregnant woman in the third trimester.109 The state’s interest in
maternal health is compelling after the first trimester, and the
state’s interest in the life of the fetus is compelling upon viability,
when the fetus can potentially sustain a meaningful life outside of
the womb, generally after the second trimester.110
                                                                                                                   
105. Id. at 435.
106. See id. (noting that the treating physician could have been subject to a homicide
charge if he failed to proceed with the abortion and the mother died, or up to seven years
imprisonment if the pregnant woman did not die).
107. Id.
108. See Fla. CS for HB 1227, § 2(6)(c) (1997) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. §
390.001 (1995)).
109. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193-94 (Fla. 1989).
110. See id. Abortion rights supporters generally agree that after viability there must
be a compelling reason for a woman to terminate a pregnancy and this reason must relate
to the woman’s life or her continued physical well-being. The Florida Supreme Court de-
fined viability in In re T.W. as occurring “at that point in time when the fetus becomes ca-
pable of meaningful life outside the womb through standard medical measures.” Id. at
1194. The court continued, “Until this point, the fetus is a highly specialized set of cells
that is entirely dependent upon the mother for sustenance. No other member of society
can provide this nourishment. The mother and fetus are so inextricably intertwined that
their interests can be said to coincide.” Id.
There is a distinction between whether a fetus can be viable outside the mother’s body
and whether it can survive outside the mother’s body. It is generally accepted in the medi-
cal community that less than 40% of fetuses born preterm survive at less than 23 weeks.
See Estelle B. Gauda & Christine A. Gleason, Neonatology, 275 JAMA 1823, 1824 (1996).
Most of these surviving infants suffer significant disabilities, such as mental retardation,
cerebral palsy, hearing loss, and visual impairment. See id.
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Federal courts have also applied the standard that the promotion
of maternal health is an appropriate justification for regulations in
the second trimester. In Roe, the Court recognized that the state has
“important and legitimate” interests in protecting maternal health,
and in the potential human life. During the second trimester, the
State “‘may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways
that are reasonably related to maternal health.’”111
The Abortion Method Ban Bill failed to accommodate the need for
an abortion where the health of the mother was at stake. Thus, the
bill was unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court in Casey held
that a state must not proscribe abortion when continuing a preg-
nancy would endanger the mother’s health or life.112 Laws very
similar to the Abortion Method Ban Bill were enjoined in Arizona
and Ohio and held unconstitutional by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan for being vague and overbroad
in their definitions of the prohibited procedure, and for failing to pro-
tect maternal health.113
The Committee Substitute for House Bill 1227 was passed by the
House by a vote of 84 to 31.114 It was passed by the Senate by a vote
of 28 to 9.115 On May 23, 1997, however, Governor Lawton Chiles ve-
toed the legislation, citing its failure to provide an exception for the
health of the pregnant woman.116
                                                                                                                   
111. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 516 (1989) (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
112. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880 (1992). The Court has also
struck down a statutory ban on saline amniocentesis abortions because the ban forced
women to terminate their pregnancies through procedures that were considerably more
dangerous to their health than the banned procedure. See Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 78 (1976).
113.  See Planned Parenthood v. Woods, No. 97-385 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 1997); Women’s
Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, Nos. 96-3157, 96-3159, 1997 WL 713520, at *1 (6th Cir.
Nov. 18, 1997), aff’g 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1057 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Evans v. Kelly, 1997 WL
471906 at *37 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 1997).
In December 1995, a federal district court in Ohio granted an injunction against an Ohio
law that was even narrower than the Florida bill. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1057,
1092, aff’d, Nos. 96-3157, 96-3159, 1997 WL 713520, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1997). The
Ohio bill created two separate bans. See id. at 1057. The first banned the use of the D&X
procedure in all abortions performed before viability. See id. The bill also banned all D&X
abortions performed after viability except where performed to save the life of the pregnant
woman or to avoid serious risk of substantial damage to a major bodily function. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the injunction and
found the law unconstitutional. See Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, Nos. 96-3157,
96-3159, 1997 WL 713520, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1997).
114. See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1095 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 28, 1997).
115. See FLA. S. JOUR. 1148 (Reg. Sess. May 1, 1997).
116. See Veto of Fla. CS for HB 1227 (1997) (letter from Gov. Chiles to Sec’y of State
Sandra Mortham, May 23, 1997) (on file with Sec’y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee,
Fla.). The Florida Legislature failed to take up the vetoed legislation for an override vote
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B.   Restricting Coverage for Abortion by Private Insurance
Companies
During the 1997 Regular Session, Representative Mark Flana-
gan117 and Senator John Grant118 introduced House Bill 1701 and
Senate Bill 2304, respectively. House Bill 1701 has been carried over
to the 1998 session pursuant to House Rule 96.119 Senate Bill 2304
died in the Committee on Banking and Insurance on May 2, 1997.120
If House Bill 1701 were to pass, the legislation would usurp a doc-
tor’s authority to determine when an abortion is medically necessary
under certain private health insurance plans.121 For coverage under
a small employer standard or basic health benefit plan, the bill de-
fines a “termination of pregnancy” as “medically necessary” only
when “necessary to save the life of the mother.”122 The standard and
basic health benefits plans must cover all medically necessary proce-
dures, including inpatient hospitalization and outpatient services for
“induced abortions and related procedures ” unless “performed to
save the life of the mother.”123 This excludes coverage of any hospi-
talization required to treat complications from a legal, outpatient
abortion, such as a hemorrhage, unless the medical care is necessary
to save the pregnant woman’s life.124
Restrictions such as these influence and interfere with the ability
of women, their families, and other loved ones in making what are
clearly very private decisions about whether and when to have chil-
dren. The fact that some may be able to afford an abortion without
insurance reimbursement does not detract from the fact that this bill
                                                                                                                   
during the Special Session held November 3-7, 1997, and is now precluded from overriding
the veto. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(b).
117. Repub., Bradenton.
118. Repub., Tampa.
119. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 310, HB 1701.
120. The Senate does not have a carry-over provision in its rules. If the Senate spon-
sor wishes to pursue this issue, the bill must be refiled.
121. See Fla. HB 1701 (1997) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 627.6699 (Supp.
1996)).
The standard health benefit plan shall include:
a. Coverage for inpatient hospitalization, except coverage for inpatient hospital
care for induced abortions and related procedures is required only when such
services are medically necessary to save the life of the mother;
b. Coverage for outpatient services, but such coverage is required for induced
abortions and related procedures only when such services are necessary to
save the life of the mother;
c. Coverage for newborn children pursuant to s. 627.6575;
Id. § 1(12)(b)(4)(a)-(c). “‘Medically necessary’ means, for purposes of covering procedures
related to termination of pregnancy, those procedures and accompanying services neces-
sary to save the life of the mother.” Id. § 1(3)(m).
122. Id. § 1(3)(m).
123. Id. § 1(12)(b)(4)(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
124. See id.
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would provide a government incentive to insurance companies to
make terminating a pregnancy more costly than carrying a preg-
nancy to term. The bill would impose administrative burdens on
companies wishing to include coverage for abortion in circumstances
that are not life threatening, but are medically necessary.
Twelve other states have struck similar restrictions as violative of
privacy rights and equal protection.125 In Florida, a lawsuit on re-
lated restrictions is pending in the Second Judicial Circuit in Leon
County, Florida, challenging the prohibition against Medicaid fund-
ing for abortion unless it is necessary to preserve the life of the
woman or if the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest.126 Medi-
caid funds all medical services for eligible indigents that are deemed
“medically necessary” except for abortion.127 “Medically necessary”
services have been defined as those that are “reasonably calculated
to prevent, diagnose, correct, cure, alleviate, or prevent the worsen-
ing of a conditions” threatening life, causing pain or suffering, or re-
sulting in illness.128
1.   Privacy Rights
The Florida Supreme Court in In re T.W. discussed the privacy
interests that are implicated when abortion restrictions are imposed:
The decision whether to obtain an abortion is fraught with  specific
physical, psychological, and economic implications  of a uniquely
personal nature for each woman. The Florida Constitution embod-
ies the principle that “[f]ew decisions are more personal and inti-
mate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity
and autonomy, than a woman’s decision . . . whether to end her
pregnancy. A woman’s right to make that choice freely is fundame n-
tal.”129
                                                                                                                   
125. See Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 799 (Cal. 1981);
Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 162 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Roe v. Harris, No. 96977 (Idaho
Dist. Ct. Feb. 1, 1994); Doe v. Wright, No. 91 CH1959 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 1994); Moe v.
Secretary of Admin. and Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 405 (Mass. 1981); Women of Minnesota v.
Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 32 (Minn. 1995); Jeannette R. v. Ellery, No. BDV-94-811 (Mont.
Dist. Ct. May 22, 1995); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 940 (N.J. 1982); New
Mexico Right to Choose v. Danfelser, No. 95-867 (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 3, 1995); Planned
Parenthood Ass’n v. Department of Human Resources, 663 P.2d 1247, 1261 (Or. App.
1983), aff’d, 687 P.2d 785 (Or. 1984); Doe v. Celani, No. S81-84CnC (Vt. Super. Ct. May
26, 1986); Women’s Health Ctr. v. Penepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 667 (W. Va. 1993).
126. See Renee B. v. State, No. 97-3983 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. filed March 8, 1995)
(transferred from Palm Beach County July 21, 1997).
127. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 59G-4.150(4)(a)(12), -4.160(4)(a)(5), -4.230(4)(a)(11)
(1996).
128. Orlando Gen. Hosp. v. Department of HRS, 567 So. 2d 962, 963 (Fla. 5th DCA
1990).
129. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) (quoting Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
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In addition, the Florida Supreme Court has also addressed the pri-
vacy violations that result when the state interferes with medical
decisions in general.
Patients do not lose their right to make decisions affecting their
lives simply by entering a health care facility. . . . [A] health care
provider’s function is to provide medical treatment in accordance
with the patient’s wishes and best interests, not as a “substitute
parent” supervening the wishes of a competent adult. . . . A health
care provider cannot act on behalf of the State to assert the state
interests in these circumstances.130
The Florida’s Constitution’s stringent protections of reproductive
choice require, at minimum, that the state remain neutral as to the
exercise of the choice. Once the Legislature takes the steps to dis-
pense funding that impacts women’s constitutionally protected right
to privacy, it must do so in a non-discriminatory fashion.131
2.   Void-For-Vagueness
House Bill 1701 uses terms that have been consistently found un-
constitutionally vague for more than twenty-five years. There is no
substantive distinction between the bill’s term “save the life” and the
term “preserve the life” of the woman or mother. 132 The phrase
“necessary to preserve the life of the mother” was found unconstitu-
tionally vague by the Florida Supreme Court.133 The court in Barquet
reiterated the U.S. Supreme Court’s position that the words
“necessary” and “preserve” are susceptible to various interpreta-
tions.134
House Bill 1701 was scheduled to be heard twice in the House
Health Care Services Committee.135 Both times the Committee de-
                                                                                                                   
130. In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 823 (Fla. 1993) (holding that a patient has a con-
stitutional privacy right to refuse medical treatment).
131. See Women’s Health Ctr. v. Penepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 666 (W. Va. 1993); Moe v.
Secretary of Admin. and Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 402 (Mass. 1981).
132. “‘Medically necessary’ means, for purposes of covering procedures related to the
termination of pregnancy, those procedures and accompanying services necessary to save
the life of the mother.” Fla. HB 1701, § 1(3)(m) (1997) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT.
§ 627.6699 (Supp. 1996)) (emphasis added).
133. See State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 435 (Fla. 1972); see also supra Part IV.A.1.
134. See Barquet 262 So. 2d at 435 (noting that “necessary” is “‘a word susceptible of
various meanings . . . [i]t may import that which is only convenient, useful, appropriate,
proper, or conducive to the end sought’”) (quoting Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1388
(N.D. Ill. 1971)). The Supreme Court has held that a statute reading “necessary for the
preservation of the mother’s life or health” instead of “necessary to preserve the life,” if
applicable after viability, could be constitutional and not void due to vagueness. See
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70-72 (1971) (recognizing that physicians must rou-
tinely decide if an operation is necessary for mental or physical health whenever surgery
is considered).
135. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 309-10, HB 1701.
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ferred a vote on the bill.136 Conversely, Senate Bill 2304 was never
placed on the agenda for hearing in the Banking and Insurance
Committee.
C.   Abortion Consent: The Woman’s Right-To-Know Act
During the 1997 Regular Session, Representative Bob Brooks137
and Senator Charles Clary138 introduced House Bill 1205 and Senate
Bill 746, respectively. The Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 746
was replaced by the Committee Substitute for House Bill 1205 on
May 1, 1997,139 and the Florida Legislature passed the bill on the
same day.140 On June 5, 1997, the Woman’s Right-To-Know Act be-
came law without the Governor’s signature.141
The Woman’s Right-To-Know Act requires a doctor performing
abortions to provide prescribed, detailed information about abortion
and its alternatives orally and in person to every patient, rather
than using his or her judgment about what degree of information is
appropriate for each patient and which of the office staff members
would be best suited to provide this information.142 The Woman’s
Right-To-Know Act also requires that an abortion patient be offered
printed materials, prepared by the Florida Department of Health,
describing fetal development and providing information on assis-
tance for prenatal care, delivery, and adoption services.143
                                                                                                                   
136. See id.
137. Repub., Winter Park.
138. Repub., Destin.
139. See FLA. S. JOUR. 1270 (Reg. Sess. May 1, 1997).
140. See Act effective July 1, 1997, ch. 97-151, 1997 Fla. Laws 2501 (amending FLA.
STAT. ch. 390 (1995 & Supp. 1996)).
141. See Press Release from Exec. Office of the Gov., Gov. Lawton Chiles (May 23,
1997) (explaining the reasons for allowing the Woman’s Right-To-Know Act to become law
without his signature) (on file with the Exec. Office of the Gov., Tallahassee, Fla.).
142. See FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(3)(a)-(c) (1997):
(a) Except in the case of a medical emergency, consent to a termination of
pregnancy is voluntary and informed only if:
1. The physician who is to perform the procedure, or the referring physician,
has, at a minimum, orally, in person, informed the woman of:
a. The nature and risks of undergoing or not undergoing the proposed proce-
dure that a reasonable patient would consider material to making a knowing
and willful decision of whether to terminate a pregnancy.
b. The probable gestational age of the fetus at the time the termination of
pregnancy is to be performed.
c. The medical risks to the woman and fetus of carrying the pregnancy to term.
Id.
143. See id. § 390.0111(3)(a)(2):
a. Except in the case of a medical emergency, consent to a termination of preg-
nancy is voluntary and informed only if:
. . . .
2. Printed materials prepared and provided by the department have been pro-
vided to the pregnant woman, is she chooses to view these materials, includ-
ing:
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On July 2, 1997, the Woman’s Right-to-Know Act was temporarily
enjoined by the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach County,
Florida.144 The court found:
[W]omen seeking to terminate pregnancies will be subjected to in-
accurate and/or misleading information, be subjected to costly
(both in time and emotion) delays waiting for physicians to per-
sonally, orally give the information required, and suffer needless
emotional stress in receiving needless information in cases where
a medical necessity (i.e. miscarriage) has mandated the termina-
tion of pregnancy.145
The Woman’s Right-To-Know Act imposes a substantial burden on a
woman’s right to choose to have an abortion. Because the informa-
tion required to be disseminated is misleading and emotionally
charged, it could effectively dissuade some women from terminating
their pregnancies, even when carrying the pregnancies to term may
effect their health in a variety of ways, and perhaps even their lives.
The Florida Supreme Court has forbidden the state from express-
ing a preference for childbirth over abortion, especially in the first
trimester of pregnancy. In In re T.W., the court said, “The state must
prove that the statute furthers a compelling state interest through
the least intensive means. Under Florida law, prior to the end of the
first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the woman and
may not be significantly restricted by the state.”146 The state has ar-
ticulated no risk to women’s health requiring this prescribed consent
procedure or any other compelling reason to dictate the informed
consent process for abortion. Moreover, the state does not require
this provision of information in any other medical situation. Because
the Woman’s Right-To-Know Act applies at any point in a preg-
nancy, it clearly and improperly applies to first trimester abortions.
1.   Privacy Rights and Consent
Based on the privacy rights provision of the Florida Constitution,
the Florida Supreme Court in In re T.W. decided that restrictions
and extra regulations on abortion could not be imposed without a
clear showing that they were necessary to protect the woman’s
                                                                                                                   
a. A description of the fetus.
b. A list of agencies that offer alternatives to terminating the pregnancy.
c. Detailed information on the availability of medical assistance benefits for
prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care.
Id.
144. See Presidential Women’s Ctr. v. State, No. 97-5796 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. July 2,
1997) (order granting preliminary injunction), appeal docketed, No. 97-2557 (Fla. 4th DCA
filed July 24, 1997).
145. Id.
146. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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health and life after the first trimester.147 The U.S. Supreme Court
warned in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and G y-
necologists148 that “[t]he states are not free, under the guise of pro-
tecting maternal health or potential life, to intimidate women into
continuing pregnancies.”149 The Florida Supreme Court has also held
that a health care provider should not be forced to decide between
the wishes of the state and the wishes of the patient.150
Laws mandating biased counseling for abortion treat women
seeking abortions as though they were less thoughtful and informed
about their medical decisions than any other group of people seeking
medical care. These laws require pregnant women to be given infor-
mation to inflict not-so-subtle state-sanctioned pressure on women to
consider the interest of the fetus above their own, even when their
lives or health may be at stake. This is a blatant intrusion of gov-
ernment into the private relationship between a woman and her doc-
tor. Such an intrusion constitutes the Florida Legislature practicing
medicine without a license.
2.   Equal Protection
More often than not, terminating a pregnancy is a difficult and
sad decision, but its physical ramifications are no more important
than other forms of invasive surgery. However, the Act does not
mandate that a doctor thrust detailed medical information on a man
advised to undergo prostate surgery.151 Moreover, this legislation
does not require that information be provided to a woman about to
experience other pregnancy-related medical procedures, such as
Caesarean sections and prenatal care, despite the fact that Caesar-
ean sections and vaginal childbirth both carry higher risks to the life
and health of the woman than abortion does at any stage of the
pregnancy.152
Clearly, the Legislature seeks to dissuade abortion. Since such
precise information is not required to be given to women undergoing
                                                                                                                   
147. See id. at 1194 (striking down a parental consent statute as a violation of article
I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, which guarantees a broader privacy right than
that implicated in the federal Constitution).
148. 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
149. Id.
150. See In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 823 (Fla. 1993).
151. It would be absurd to pass a law requiring that informed consent for any life-
saving surgery, such as an appendectomy or melanoma removal, include information on
hospice care and the availability of burial alternatives if the patient should choose not to
undergo the procedure.
152. See Lisa M. Koonin et al., Pregnancy-Related Mortality Surveillance—United
States, 1987-1990: Results (visited Dec. 15, 1997) <http://www.amaassn.org/special/contra/
treatmnt/guide/mmwr0897/preg/preg3.htm> (information provided by the Journal of the
American Medical Association).
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a more risky procedure or assuming the higher risks of continuing
their pregnancies,153 this legislation is intended to discourage women
from following through on the constitutionally protected right to
choose to terminate pregnancy.154
Even if the legislation is able to meet the U.S. Supreme Court’s
relaxed standards for abortion restrictions, it will not meet the more
stringent standards required by the Florida Constitution. Despite
the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld properly crafted
parental consent requirements for minors’ abortions,155 the Florida
Supreme Court has made it clear that such laws are unconstitu-
tional under our state constitution unless the state has a compelling
interest.156
3.   Void-For-Vagueness
The Woman’s Right-To-Know Act violates the due process clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution
because it fails to set standards for what constitutes a pregnancy
that is life-threatening. Moreover, it contains apparently conflicting
provisions. Due process mandates that laws provide persons subject
to regulation “a reasonable opportunity to know what [conduct] is
prohibited, so that [they] may act accordingly.”157 A statute that is
punitive in nature must be sufficiently defined “to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute.”158 The Woman’s Right-To-Know Act con-
tains numerous provisions that are vague and susceptible to chal-
lenge.
In an emergency situation where it is not possible to obtain the
pregnant woman’s written informed consent, the physician must still
                                                                                                                   
153. “Due to technological developments in second-trimester abortion procedures, the
point at which abortions are safer than childbirth may have been extended into the second
trimester.” In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989).
154. Florida law already requires informed consent of all patients undergoing medical
procedures. See FLA. STAT. § 766.103 (1997). A pregnant woman seeking an abortion
knows if she does not have one she will almost certainly give birth to a child and that
adoption, child support, and assistance with medical care for the indigent are options.
155. See Lambert v. Wickland, 117 S. Ct. 1169, 1172 (1997) (Montana statute);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992) (Pennsylvania statute); Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (Ohio statute).
156. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1195.
157. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
158. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 572 n.8 ( 1974) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926));
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (warning that due process is violated if a
statute provides no clear standard of conduct and provides enforcement authorities with
the unfettered freedom to act on nothing but their own preferences and beliefs); Aztec Mo-
tel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Faircloth, 251 So. 2d 849, 854 (Fla. 1971) (“The underlying princi-
ple is that no man shall be held responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably un-
derstand to be proscribed.”).
1998]                         REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY RIGHTS 295
obtain at least one corroborative medical opinion attesting to the
medical necessity for the procedure and the fact that the woman’s
life is threatened.159 The only exception states, “In the event no sec-
ond physician is available for a corroborating opinion, the physician
may proceed but shall document reasons for the medical necessity in
the patient’s medical records.”160
This provision threatens the life and health of women whose
pregnancies are life-threatening. Physicians may act conservatively
when aggressive medical measures are necessary. If a corroborating
physician cannot be found, this provision does not make it clear that
the physician can proceed without risk of sanction. It only makes it
clear that if he or she does proceed, the medical records must dis-
tinctly document the circumstances that threatened the woman’s
life.
Unlike other medical procedures, the Woman’s Right-To-Know
Act does not allow for appropriate forms of substitute consent, such
as next-of-kin consent.161 The only substitute consent the legislation
allows is for mental incompetents who have had guardians ap-
pointed by a court.162
In a circumstance where a competent woman is unconscious, a
physician risks losing his license to practice medicine if he or she is
not certain that the patient has an imminent life-threatening condi-
tion caused by the pregnancy.163 This is true even if the pregnant
woman had earlier expressed her wish to undergo the procedure in
the event that circumstances arose placing her life in jeopardy, un-
less the physician had also provided the required consent informa-
tion and obtained her written consent.
                                                                                                                   
159. See FLA STAT. § 390.0111(3)(b)-(c) (1997).
(b) In the event a medical emergency exists and a physician cannot comply
with the requirements for informed consent, a physician may terminate a
pregnancy if he or she has obtained at least one corroborative medical opinion
attesting to the medical necessity for emergency medical procedures and to the
fact that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty the continuation of the
pregnancy would threaten the life of the pregnant woman. In the event no sec-
ond physician is available for a corroborating opinion, the physician may pro-
ceed but shall document reasons for the medical necessity in the patient’s rec-
ords.
(c) Violation of this subsection by a physician constitutes grounds for disci-
plinary action under § 458.331 or § 459.015. Substantial compliance or reason-
able belief that complying with the requirements of informed consent would




161. See id. § 766.103.
162. See id. § 390.0111(3).
163. See id. § 390.0111(3)(c).
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The dangers of the Woman’s Right-To-Know Act are not cured by
the inclusion of the provision stating that “[s]ubstantial compliance
or a reasonable belief that complying with the requirements of in-
formed consent would threaten the life or health of the patient is a
defense to any action brought under this paragraph.”164 The bottom
line is that states may not constitutionally impose restrictions on
abortion if it is necessary to preserve the woman’s life or health at
any time during a pregnancy.165 The substantial compliance or rea-
sonable belief provision still requires an interpretation of whether
the physician acted appropriately when not seeking informed con-
sent. Knowing that a decision to proceed without informed consent
may be subject to “second guessing,” a physician may not proceed in
a manner that is in the woman’s best interest for fear of civil or
criminal prosecution.
A statute may also be vague if it is subject to arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement because it fails to provide explicit stan-
dards for those applying the law. As the Court explained in Grayned
v. City of Rockford ,166 a law that does not provide clear standards for
those who must apply it is void-for-vagueness because it
“impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”167
The Woman’s Right-To-Know Act expressly states that the physi-
cian must inform the woman of the “medical risks to the woman and
fetus” of carrying the pregnancy to term.168 However, the Act also re-
quires the physician to inform the woman of the “nature and risks of
undergoing or not undergoing the proposed procedure,” and does not
limit itself to medical risks.169 The principle of statutory construction
that “express mention is implied exclusion”170 indicates that the Act
requires that information concerning only the medical risks related
to carrying a pregnancy to term be provided, but that information
concerning all the risks related to abortion be provided.171 However,
the plain meaning of the latter provision dictates that this informa-
tion be broader than just the medical risks, and the legislative his-
                                                                                                                   
164. Id.
165. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
166. 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
167. Id. at 108-09 (footnote omitted).
168. FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(3)(a)(1)(c) (1997).
169. Id. § 390.0111(3)(a)(1)(a).
170. Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976) (construing a restaurant licensing
statute); see also Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952) (construing a stat-
ute establishing time bars for worker’s compensation); Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v.
Cauley, 651 So. 2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (construing a statute governing coop-
erative leaseholds).
171. See FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(3)(a)(1)(c) (1997).
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tory of the Act bears this out.172 Thus, the Act is subject to a reason-
able interpretation that the information provided must include, but
is not limited to, financial risks, social risks, emotional risks, and
educational risks. All of these areas of a woman’s life are undeniably
and directly affected by her decision of whether and when to have a
child.
The Act provides no guidance on which of a multitude of risks of
undergoing or not undergoing the proposed procedure must be dis-
cussed and which might be skipped to avoid the statutory penalties.
Thus, it is impermissibly vague. It requires doctors to become profi-
cient in fields for which they are not professionally trained as spe-
cialists, such as neonatology, genetics, pathology of fetal abnormal-
ity, theology, philosophy, religion, and bioethics.
4.   First Amendment Violations
The Woman’s Right-To-Know Act requires the attending physi-
cian to recite the state-prescribed information and offer state-
authorized materials to the patient.173 Because these requirements
may require physicians to act against their best medical judgment
and to be couriers of the state’s ideological message on abortion, the
Act violates a physician’s right to free speech as guaranteed by the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.174
The Act requires a physician to inform the woman about certain
aspects of the nature of abortion and childbirth about which there is
no consensus and for which a physician may not be trained. The Act
requires a doctor to guess as to exactly what information is required
to be provided to the patient and, if he or she speculates incorrectly,
to be subject to disciplinary action.175 This will have a chilling effect
upon speech, deny women their constitutional rights, and deny phy-
sicians the right to speak and act as their professional training and
consciences dictate.
V.   CONCLUSION
No consensus exists in our society regarding the non-medical na-
ture of abortion. Some see it as the cessation of a potential human
life, but not an actual human life. Some see it as murder. Some see it
as immoral. The Florida Supreme Court has described abortion as a
                                                                                                                   
172. See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1086, 1087 (Reg. Session Apr. 28, 1997).
173. See FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(3) (1997).
174. See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943) (holding that the
First Amendment right to free speech includes the right to refrain from speaking). The
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of
the broader concept of “individual freedom of mind.” See id. at 637.
175. See FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(3)(c) (1997).
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most basic fundamental constitutional privacy right that a person
may, up to the point of viability, exercise without governmental in-
trusion under Florida law.
The legislation’s requirement that physicians inform women
about the non-medical nature of continuing pregnancies to term pre-
sents similar difficulties. For some, the nature of childbirth repre-
sents a contribution to overpopulation, to others the most glorious
and remarkable event in a person’s life, to others a blessed occur-
rence and a gift from the Almighty, to others a shameful punishment
for sin or the worst crisis they have ever faced, to others an oppor-
tunity to enlarge a family, and for others the potential destruction of
the family unit. In the case of a pregnancy resulting from rape or in-
cest, the stress and emotional difficulty of discussing the nature of
abortion or childbirth are greatly compounded.
Nonetheless, the Woman’s Right-To-Know Act requires physi-
cians to provide information that is “material” to a woman’s decision
whether or not to undergo a termination of pregnancy, no matter
what her particular circumstance might entail. There are no guide-
lines, standards, or definitions to advise the physician in under-
standing how much of the pregnant woman’s medical or other per-
sonal history must be known to assure the physician’s compliance.
The physician could be required to be aware of all factors that
might possibly cause any complications or bad outcomes during
stages of the pregnancy far more advanced than the stage at which
the abortion would be performed. Physicians could also be required
to be aware of exceedingly rare or statistically insignificant possi-
bilities of complications depending on the physical condition of that
particular patient. Physicians could also be required to be up-to-the-
minute on statistical information if or when new medical develop-
ments begin to decrease or increase risks. The Act fails to specify
with clarity the physician’s responsibility concerning the information
he or she is required to provide if the procedure or method being
used is relatively new and if the degree of risk has changed or is not
statistically known.
The statistics for Florida show that 80,040 abortions were in-
duced in 1996.176 Of these abortions less than one percent, or fewer
than twelve, were performed after viability. Women still die in
childbirth and from pregnancies that go wrong. Sometimes this is
unexpected. At other times, however, women know how high the risk
is and take it anyway.
The Woman’s Right-To-Know Act did not change the preferential
consideration given to a woman’s life and health when either of these
                                                                                                                   
176. See Fla. S. Comm. on Health Care, CS for SB 1398 (1997) Staff Analysis 1 (Apr.
18, 1997) (on file with comm.).
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is in conflict with the life and health of her fetus. The Florida statute
says:
If a termination of pregnancy is performed during viability, no per-
son who performs or induces the termination of pregnancy shall
fail to use that degree of professional skill, care, and diligence to
preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would
be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of
any fetus intended to be born and not aborted. . . . Notwithstand-
ing the provisions of this subsection, the woman’s life and health
shall constitute an overriding and superior consideration to the
concern for the life and health of the fetus when such concerns are
in conflict.177
This has been the law in Florida for nearly twenty years178 and
continues to be the law. It constitutes an appropriate recognition
that the protection of an existing human should take precedence
over the protection of a fetus, whether viable or unviable. This is a
good balance and should not be changed.
                                                                                                                   
177. FLA. STAT.  § 390.0111(4) (1997) (emphasis added).
178. See Act effective July 1, 1979, ch. 79-302, § 1, 1979 Fla. Laws 1596, 1615 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 458.505(5) (1979)).
